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In Finance Behind the Veil of Money, Eduard Braun (2014: 30-36) takes the minority view 
that opportunity costs are not only unnecessary but even unhelpful to understanding choice.1 
In doing so he follows George Reisman (1996: 460) who also views the “doctrine of 
opportunity cost” as not only unnecessary to ascertain how one makes better decisions, but 
that its “sole contribution is obfuscation, not perception.” Both Braun and Reisman believe 
that it is unnecessary to include foregone alternatives in the calculus of cost since it implies 
that “one must suffer by virtue of possessing the very qualities that create one’s success [i.e., 
better opportunities]” (Reisman 1996: 460).  
 
Such a view errs by overlooking the difference between the actor’s ex-ante expectations of an 
action with the ex-post results. More importantly, it mistakes what role costs in general, and 
opportunity costs by extension, serve in economic theory. 
 
In his “Reply” in this issue, Braun demonstrates this misunderstanding of the ex-ante and ex-
post roles of opportunity costs when he criticizes Rothbard´s (1962: 606-607) analysis of the 
relationship between monetary and psychic profits.2 In Rothbard´s example, an investor 
spends 5,000 gold oz. to earn 1,000 oz. net profit. The foregone alternative is comprised of 1) 
                                                
1
 Although Braun claims that “the main arguments in [his] book do not depend on [his] approach to the cost 
problem”, there is no doubt that his variant of cost theory derives a distinct theory of interest which is of utmost 
importance in valuing financial assets, one of the main themes of his book.  
2
 Although Reisman does not cite this example from Rothbard, he argues against several similar examples 
(1996: 459-60).  
250 oz. he could have earned by investing his capital at the prevailing interest rate of 5%, 2) 
500 oz. he could have earned by working for a competing firm, and 3) 400 oz. of lost income 
since he used his factory instead of renting it out. With total opportunity costs of 1,150 oz., 
Rothbard concludes that the “entrepreneur suffered a loss of 150 ounces over the period. If 
his opportunity costs had been less than 1,000, he would have gained an entrepreneurial 
profit” (Rothbard 1962: 607).  
 
Braun objects to Rothbard’s conclusion for two reasons. First, he finds it questionable that 
Rothbard constructs “arbitrary” figures to define the investor’s opportunity costs. Yet while 
these figures may seem arbitrary to Braun, they are an assumption by Rothbard and real to 
the hypothetical investor. The 1,150 oz. in foregone income is actually what the investor 
could have earned had he used his resources differently. The investor knows these figures 
through the benefit of hindsight, and from them he can determine from an ex post facto 
perspective the sum his foregone opportunities could have yielded. 
 
Second, Braun objects to the conclusion that the entrepreneur made a loss. He did, after all, 
come out of his investment 1,000 oz. richer than he started and this is, as Braun correctly 
states, profit according to “traditional accounting principles.”  The point of Rothbard’s 
example is not to show that the investor did not earn a monetary profit, but rather to show 
that he could have done better. The fact that he earned an entrepreneurial loss provides a 
signal that he must do better in the future or be forced out of the market. To forestall one 
objection to this conclusion, one could counter that as long as the firm earns positive 
monetary profits it will not risk insolvency and thus will remain in the market. Such an 
objection fails to realize that the firm would be forced out of the market if all other competing 
firms changed their activities in a way that maximized their entrepreneurial profits while one 
firm continued incurring entrepreneurial losses (as in this example). This is because a firm 
must not only earn positive (absolute) monetary profits to remain in business, but must also 
earn positive entrepreneurial profits relative to other firms, lest those firms undercut its 
business and steal market share (as in Carelli and Dempster 2001: 326; Huerta de Soto 2006: 
664-71). No firm can continue earning entrepreneurial losses indefinitely and so an ex post 
facto assessment of the relevant opportunity costs is an essential part of the entrepreneurial 
process.  
 
Constraining the costs to specific monetary expenditures instead of general opportunities 
foregone does a great injustice to the decision-making process. The beauty of Rothbard´s 
(1962: 606-607) example is that the entrepreneur now realizes he has erred. Braun places the 
goal of maximizing money income as primal for the entrepreneur (Braun 2014: 109, 115, 116 
and passim), yet his approach leaves no method for the entrepreneur to see if he has, in fact, 
done so. 
 
Although Braun focuses on this example from Rothbard, his (and Reisman´s) largest 
objection to the opportunity cost doctrine is that it leads to the conclusion that having more 
options is worse for the individual, since the more options one has, the greater will be the cost 
of the foregone alternative. In this regard, I will (re)address Braun´s (2014: 32) apple 
example: 
 
Let us suppose friends X and Y are on a trip in the mountains. X has two apples in his 
bag. Y loves apples, but has forgotten to pack one. During the first break, X permits Y 
to take one of the apples. Well, one could say this is a great deal for Y! However, 
things look differently if one takes into account opportunity cost. As soon as Y takes 
one of the two apples, he abstains from taking the other one. If we assume, for 
simplicity, that the two apples are alike, then the disadvantage in this decision is just 
as great as the advantage. According to opportunity-cost theory, Y is not better off at 
all although he has received an apple for free. His preference for one of them cost him 
the other one. 
 
This case has two solutions. The first is to treat the two apples as they are in the example: 
alike (or, as I (Howden 2016: 125fn1) have shown in more conventional terms, that X is 
indifferent between the two apples). I addressed previously the unconventional nature of this 
problem for the Austrian-school economist, not least because the assumption of indifference 
is not well accepted (see, e.g., Rothbard 1956), and I provided one method to analyze this 
problem within an Austrian framework (Howden 2016: 126).3  
 
In his “Reply” in this issue, Braun relaxes the assumption that the hiker is indifferent between 
the two apples. His basic result is the same, which leads Braun to conclude that “[t]he 
purpose of the example is to show that if one takes the opportunity cost concept seriously, 
having options is worse and leads to less profit than having no options at all.” 
 
On the one hand, if Braun´s hiker had “no options at all”, he would starve which is likely a 
worse outcome than having two apples to choose from. But there is an apparent grain of truth 
to the statement. The more options one has at his disposal, the more satisfying will be the 
“next-best alternative” the actor must forego for any course of action. While one could think 
                                                
3
 A second objection to Braun’s analysis is that Braun combines two choices into one alternative. In actual fact, 
the hiker first has the option of choosing an apple or starving, and second he must choose between which apple 
to consume. I (2016: 125) alluded to the similarities with to Buridan’s ass in the first of the two choices, and I 
thank Jonathan Newman for pointing out the second.  
that this leads to an increase in opportunity cost for the actor a close analysis reveals this is 
not the case.  
 
Assume the thirsty and hungry hiker has the following preference rank: 
 
Rank   Alternative 
1st 
 
red apple 
2nd  
 
yellow apple 
3rd  
 
granola bar 
4th  
 
1st reading, Braun (2014) 
. 
 
. 
. 
 
. 
(n-1)th 
 
death 
nth    2nd reading, (Braun 2014) 
Table 1: The hiker’s preference rank 
 
Faced with the option of consuming either the red or yellow apple, the hiker chooses the 
more highly valued red apple and expects to earn the psychic profit of the difference in his 
preference between the red apple and the best foregone alternative, the yellow apple, leaving 
him with the expectation of psychic profit x as in table 2. 
 
Expected Psychic Revenue Red Apple 
Less: Foregone Alternative Yellow Apple 
Expected Psychic Profit x 
Table 2: Revenues, costs and profit 
 
Now assume that the offer of the yellow apple was retracted, and the hiker was offered the 
choice between only the red apple and a granola bar. Using Braun and Reisman’s logic, since 
the granola bar is less highly valued than the yellow apple, his foregone alternative will be 
less and thus his psychic profit will increase. Taking this extension to its conclusion, if the 
friend only offers a red apple, the foregone alternative will be death. Forgoing this lowly 
valued alternative would leave the hiker with the largest amount of psychic profit. It is this 
logic that Braun and Reisman have in mind when they consider having more options to be 
bad for the actor since more options seem, ceteris paribus, to reduce psychic profits.  
 
As any hungry hiker can attest, the fact that the hiker is nourished but will only receive a 
seemingly small amount of psychic profit (both ex ante and ex post) must strike the reader as 
odd. He did, after all, forestall death by having one apple presented to him, and surely being 
offered either of two apples must be better yet. The reconciliation to this paradox comes from 
using the opportunity doctrine within its proper domain.  
 
The first use of opportunity cost is to determine which alternative to pursue by focusing on 
that which foregoes the least valuable alternative. In table 3 we can see that there are only 
two possible best foregone alternatives. For the 2nd through nth ranked options the best 
foregone alternative will be the 1st ranked alternative (i.e., the red apple). For the 1st ranked 
option, the best foregone alternative will be the 2nd most highly ranked alternative (i.e., the 
yellow apple). Since the red apple is preferred to the yellow apple, pursuing the 1st ranked 
alternative will result in the lowest opportunity cost.   
 
Rank   Alternative   Opportunity Cost 
1st 
 
red apple 
 
yellow apple 
2nd  
 
yellow apple 
 
red apple 
3rd  
 
granola bar 
 
red apple 
4th  
 
1st reading, Braun (2014) 
 
red apple 
. 
 
. 
  
. 
 
. 
 
. 
(n-1)th 
 
death 
 
red apple 
nth    2nd reading, (Braun 2014)   red apple 
Table 3: Opportunity costs  
 
Alternatively, one can see that choosing the most highly ranked option will also result in the 
highest amount of expected psychic profit. The first ranked alternative will be the only one 
that incurs an opportunity cost valued less highly than it is. Thus only the first ranked 
alternative can create a positive amount of expected psychic profit, as in table 4.  
 
Rank   Alternative   Opportunity Cost   Psychic Profit 
1st 
 
red apple 
 
yellow apple 
 
positive 
2nd  
 
yellow apple 
 
red apple 
 
negative 
3rd  
 
granola bar 
 
red apple 
 
negative 
4th  
 
1st reading, Braun (2014) 
 
red apple 
 
negative 
. 
 
. 
   
. 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
(n-1)th 
 
death 
 
red apple 
 
negative 
nth    2nd reading, (Braun 2014)   red apple   negative 
Table 4: Psychic profit 
 
Note that adding more options does not change this analysis. The hiker will still choose the 
red apple even if we add a new alternative (except if the new alternative is more highly 
ranked than the existing red apple). Braun is incorrect in stating that “having options is worse 
and leads to less profit than having no options at all.”  Adding a new option to the actor’s 
preference ranking will either: 1) create a new negative expected psychic profit (which is of 
no relevance since the option will not be pursued), if the alternative is in the 2nd or lower rank 
on the preference rank, or 2) increase the expected psychic profit if the newly introduced 
option takes the 1st place on the preference rank.  
 
The second use of opportunity costs is an ex-post facto assessment to determine if the chosen 
option was the correct one. It is this use that Braun and Reisman invoke often, though to 
illustrate (incorrectly) buyer’s remorse.4 While the previous ex-ante role of opportunity cost 
rests on expectations of both revenues and profits, in the ex-post role we actually know how 
events did turn out. Of course it could be that we chose wrong, e.g., the red apple might have 
been rotten. With this new knowledge we can revise our preference ranking, perhaps shifting 
the red apple lower in the expectation that other similar apples may also be rotten. In this 
way, we partake in a trial-and-error process that improves our decisions in light of newly 
revealed information concerning the nature and relationship of expected psychic revenues 
and resultant opportunity costs. Buyer’s remorse is not a sign that the use of opportunity costs 
is deficient but that our estimations of what those costs could be differed from their actual 
realization.  
 
Braun insists that all costs be treated as historical money costs. Of course it is one of the great 
advantages of the price system that money prices provide a common denominator in which 
all values can be distilled to and compared. The common denominator of money is thus 
essential to compare different foregone alternatives on an even footing, so Braun is half right 
when he focuses on money costs. He errs, however, to the extent that money revenues 
comprise only some of the opportunities foregone. 
 
In the simplest example used by every Principles of Economics instructor, the cost for the 
student to pursue a University degree is four years of tuition plus four years of time foregone. 
Four years of tuition is easily valued and (before discounts and scholarships) equal for all 
                                                
4
 Strangely, Reisman does not use this ex-post role of opportunity costs in “ascertaining how one might do 
better” (1996: 460). In a similar way, Braun does not realize that when he laments that the opportunity cost 
doctrine “neglects costs when they actually arise – in action” that it is this ex-post facto assessment that allows 
the actor to use opportunity costs with the benefit of the hindsight that his action allows for (Braun 2014: 33).  (I 
deal with this latter objection by Braun in Howden (2015: 579-80).) 
students (e.g., four years at $40,000 per year). The time foregone can only be compared with 
this monetary cost if it is valued in money terms. Since the particular monetary value on time 
will differ depending on one’s opportunities the easiest method to value these four “lost” 
years is with wages foregone. If one could have worked at a job for $20,000 per year, the 
value of these four years will be $80,000. Taken together, the total opportunity cost of a 
University education is $240,000 of which $160,000 will be an actual money outlay and the 
remainder lost wages. The student will register for University if he values the four-year 
degree more than the value of the foregone alternatives, $240,000.  
 
Braun wants to throw the baby out with the bathwater in ignoring the lost wages, since it is 
not a historically incurred monetary cost.  This would set the bar much lower for students to 
decide to go to University (among other decisions) since, e.g., in the above example only 
two-thirds of the foregone alternatives were in a historically incurred monetary form. It is 
trivial to state the importance of the value of the non-monetary foregone alternatives since 
they can, in many cases, make the monetary costs unimportant.5  
 
I will close by asking how Braun would solve the following question without resorting to 
non-historically incurred monetary costs.  
 
Students A and B value a University education the same, and also must pay the same 
tuition rate. A has few opportunities in life and the best foregone use of the four years 
is a minimum wage job (i.e., $80,000). B has an offer to play basketball for the 
                                                
5
 I would venture that the vast majority of our decisions have no monetary component, and can only be decided 
on by comparing expected psychic revenues. My decision to watch Real Madrid play soccer instead of FC 
Barcelona can be explained with tables 1 through 4 by substituting watching Real Madrid as my most preferred 
alternative and FC Barcelona as my second ranked option. No money changes hands, but only one choice will 
have a positive expected psychic profit. Braun could counter that he focuses on business decisions, which 
generally have a money component. This would only beg the question as to why a different decision-making 
process is necessary for businesses than individuals.  
Cleveland Cavaliers for $13 mn. for the first three years, with an option to play a 
fourth year for $6 mn. B opts to not go to University, while A registers in an 
undergraduate economics program.  
 
Given the preferences and historically incurred monetary costs are identical, how does Braun 
propose to explain the difference in choice?6 
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6
 The interested reader can find the correct answer in Howden (2016b).  
